A Friend's Review of Arguments for Homosexuality

At the root of the acceptance of homosexuality are three basic arguments: 1. It is a private act and not a public one. Therefore it should be judged against private or individual standards of morality. 2. It is a permanent state of identity with an indeterminate cause, which falls outside of genetic or environmental exclusivity. Therefore if it just “happens” irreversibly then it is an act of nature. And to deny it or to act in contradiction to it would be artificial, unnatural and futile. Furthermore, if this phenomenon fulfils characteristics with which one can classify it as natural then, as with other “natural” acts, it is morally acceptable. 3. As a society we promote the actualisation of individual desires where one is free of moral absolutism. Expression of sexual preference falls within this category. Therefore given points 1 and 2 and the centrality of moral relativism in the predominant liberal movement, homosexuality should be protected in line with other characteristics such as gender, race and religion; Or indeed any other characteristic that has suffered from moral absolutism. I have tried to sketch out in a short space the arguments which form the root of the acceptance of homosexuality in a liberal philosophical environment. I will leave it to the reader to work out how various, fuller arguments follow from these basic premises. The purpose at my attempt to reduce these arguments to this basic level is to show that the acceptance of these fundamental arguments requires the acceptance of certain subjective principles and that acceptance of these subjective principles does not occur in traditions outside of the western liberal framework. Therefore it would be unreasonable for us to expect that other moral frameworks will as readily adopt homosexuality. The first argument rests upon the distinction between public and private domains. [what is the implication of this]. As Raymond Guess argues in his book “public goods, private goods”, our demarcation between “public” and “private” is subjective. Geuss gives the example of Diogenes of Sinope’s masturbation in the marketplace and how the expulsion of bodily fluid is seen as morally wrong. Clearly, masturbation or the expulsion of bodily fluid is a private act but when conducted in a public forum it becomes a public act and judged to a different moral code. If we are to claim that homosexuality is a private act what are we to make of it when it enters the public domain. For example, do we adopt the public moral code when we see to homosexuals display affection on the street? Or even less obviously what is the appropriate code for any outward displays of homosexuality? By this I mean any outward symbolism, say clothing, mannerisms, language or even congregation at places. Clearly, a line has to be drawn somewhere for one cannot expect to be a homosexual and have zero outward symbols. For me this highlights a problem; is there in actual fact a public and private section of a moral code and if there is can we apply realistically apply them? To me it is evident that this demarcation of public and private an arbitrary one that is useful in applying the moral framework of the liberal tradition. It cannot be shown that this is a necessary or even a universal feature of moral frameworks. Argument 2 above has been a little difficult to summarise for it tries to encompass a sprawling range of arguments. What I have tried to capture are arguments that essentially rest on the idea that moral responsibility derives from actions of free will. Such arguments are given force by intrinsically arguing that the world is deterministic to a degree that is acceptable. If the world is deterministic to a degree then one cannot be held accountable for one’s actions to that degree. For example if I am inclined to homosexuality then this is determined by my mental proclivity, which is beyond my control, therefore is it right to hold me morally accountable for this which is beyond my control? When faced with such a proposition it is easier to cede this ground than to accept that the entire basis for our moral framework, as implied by a fully deterministic world, is not based on firm foundations. This argument is helped further by the modern creation of the homosexual identity. For it is more easily accepted that there is no moral responsibility for what one “is” rather than for what one “does. I hope that it is clear that argument 2 rests on ideas that are particular to the western liberal thought; a deterministic world and a moral framework wrought from the foundations of divine providence. The final argument is perhaps the most difficult to assess but it is more straightforward when trying to show that homosexuality can only thrive in an ideological framework particular to liberalism in the west. It is very difficult to pin down what this amorphous idea of “Liberalism” truly is but the key idea that is relevant to our discussion here is that within Liberalism is something akin to moral relativism developed (in large part by John Rawls) from a Kantian tradition. Here, the absolutist or universalist idea of morality as underpinned by divine authority is replaced by the acceptance that there is no universal moral standard by which we should judge the actions of people. I accept that such a position is not satisfactory in helping to build a moral framework and as such much effort has been expended on developing a system based on other ideas such as “justice” or “human rights”. Whatever the successes of such attempts, it is this idea that different moral codes can and should exist that is relevant to our discussion. For it is only because of this can we have the public/private dichotomy in argument 1 or allow individual actualisation of freedoms in argument 3. At this point perhaps it is important to make clear for my support of the acceptance of homosexuality in the western liberal tradition. I may think that the public/private demarcation is without real basis; that it is odd that we accept arguments based on the deterministic nature of free will for homosexuality but not for other behaviours; and that we are yet to build a coherent moral framework following our demolition of a divinely inspired one. Yet these choices that we have made have been important so that we can build a pluralistic society and avoid falling to the abyss of moral nihilism. However, I hope it is clear that within say an Islamic framework the current arguments of homosexuality have no grounds. In Islam there is no separation between the public and private when it comes to morality; moral responsibility of action does not rely on the deterministic nature of free will and there cannot be an acceptance that for a Muslim there is any other moral framework than that proscribed by God. Therefore if these tenets do not exist how can we expect an adoption of the acceptance of homosexuality? Indeed, taking this view it is counterproductive to attack the religion for its non-acceptance. To do so goes against the Liberal tradition as we are compelling them to accept philosophical artifices that are particular to the western liberal tradition.